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Using a large data set of European firms, this paper provides evidence that operations at 
multinational headquarters are significantly more profitable than operations at their foreign 
subsidiaries. The effect turns out to be robust and quantitatively large. Our findings suggest 
that the profitability gap is partly driven by agency costs which arise if value–driving 
functions are managed by a subsidiary that is geographically separated from the headquarters 
management. In line with falling communication and travel costs over the last decade, the 
profitability gap is shown to decline over time. Apart from that, our results indicate that a 
higher competitiveness of multinational firms in their home markets also contributes to the 
profitability gap. We discuss various implications of our findings. 
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The purpose of this paper is to compare the proﬁtability of corporate activities at
multinational headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries. Although the emergence and
investment behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are well studied (see e.g.
Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2006; Brakman and Garretsen, 2008), the literature
has so far largely neglected to investigate the proﬁt distribution within multinational
groups. Exceptions are recent public ﬁnance papers which suggest that multinational
proﬁts tend to be distorted towards aﬃliates with a low corporate tax rate as MNEs
shift paper proﬁts from high-tax to low-tax entities and tend to bias the location of
proﬁtable investment projects in favor of low-tax aﬃliates (e.g. Devereux and Maﬃni,
2007; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2008; Becker, Fuest, and
Riedel, 2009).
Our paper adds to this literature by testing whether the proﬁtability of headquarters
activities statistically diﬀers from activities undertaken at foreign subsidiaries. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst study to empirically investigate this question
although a set of existing theoretical papers (implicitly) suggests that headquarters
activities exhibit a higher proﬁtability than operations located at multinational sub-
sidiaries. One strand of papers which is related to the notion of “vertical” foreign direct
investment (FDI) proposes that this pattern arises due to agency costs faced by the
headquarters management if valuable assets and functions are located with geograph-
ically separated subsidiaries (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak,
1999; O’Donnell, 2000). An alternative explanation for the headquarters bias is implied
by the theoretical literature on “horizontal” FDI which suggests that investments at the
parent location may exhibit a higher proﬁtability because MNEs have advantages when
operating in their home market as they know the language, culture and customs better
than foreign competitors (see e.g. Dunning, 1977; Brakman and Garretsen, 2008).
To test for the proﬁtability gap between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries,
we exploit a large European ﬁrm data set which is available for the years 1999 to 2006.
Our results indicate that the proﬁtability of headquarters investments indeed largely
outweighs the proﬁtability of investments at foreign subsidiaries. Our most conservative
estimates quantify the proﬁtability gap with around 30%. The results turn out to be
robust against the use of diﬀerent proﬁtability measures and the inclusion of a large set
of control variables (multinational group ﬁxed eﬀects (to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity between MNEs), country ﬁxed eﬀects (to control for productivity diﬀerences
between countries), industry ﬁxed eﬀects, the size of the input factors, the corporate
2leverage and ﬁrm age (to account for set up costs faced by young corporations)).
Moreover, we test how the proﬁt gap has evolved over time. If proﬁtability diﬀer-
ences between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries were driven by agency costs,
one would presume that the proﬁtability gap has declined in the last decade as new
technological developments, like the invention of the internet and mobile phone, have
led to reductions in communication and monitoring costs. Although the predictions for
the home market eﬀect are less clear cut, a similar pattern might arise. Interestingly,
our data indeed suggests a signiﬁcant drop in the parent bias by at least 1.5 percentage
points per year, implying that the proﬁtability gap has closed by at least 15% over our
sample period (1999-2006) whereas some speciﬁcations point to a closure of the gap by
more than 30%.
Following these baseline estimates, we additionally assess whether and to what ex-
tent agency costs and the home market eﬀect contribute to the proﬁtability gap. To
do so, we distinguish between “vertical” and “horizontal” FDI as the agency costs
argument is mainly tied to the former while the home market advantage argument
is largely tied to the latter. Thus, we divide the sample in two subgroups, the ﬁrst
comprising multinationals where the parent ﬁrm and the observed subsidiary operate
in the same 4-digit NACE industry (proxying for horizontal FDI) and the second com-
prising multinationals where the parent ﬁrm and the observed subsidiary operate in
diﬀerent 4-digit NACE industries (proxying for vertical FDI). The proﬁtability gap
between parents and subsidiaries prevails in both groups suggesting that agency costs
and the home market eﬀect play a role in driving the results. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
the proﬁtability gap closes over time in the vertical FDI group (in line with the notion
of falling communication and agency costs) while the eﬀect remains constant in the
horizontal FDI-group.
Furthermore, we run a large set of robustness checks. Most importantly, we assess
whether the proﬁtability gap derived in this paper is unique to the international con-
text or whether it prevails in national groups. Our estimations indicate a statistically
signiﬁcant proﬁtability gap between headquarters and their domestic subsidiaries that
is measured to be around one third of the gap derived in our baseline speciﬁcations.
In additional sensitivity checks, the paper among others shows that the derived prof-
itability pattern is not driven by mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and does not reﬂect
avoidance of dividend withholding taxes.
In a last step, we discuss potential implications of the presented parent bias for eco-
nomic welfare and public economic policy. Proﬁtability is expected to aﬀect a country’s
3welfare along several lines. It for example determines the size of the ﬁrm’s corporate
tax payments and thus, our analysis suggests that parent ﬁrms pay higher taxes on
their corporate activity than subsidiaries. This presumption is conﬁrmed in our data.
Conditioning on aﬃliate size and the host country’s corporate tax rate, tax payments
at multinational headquarters are found to be 60% larger than tax payments at their
multinational subsidiaries. In a companion paper (Dischinger and Riedel, 2009), we
moreover show that MNEs are reluctant to shift proﬁts and proﬁtable assets away from
the headquarters ﬁrm in response to corporate tax rate diﬀerentials. Additionally, aﬃl-
iate proﬁtability is well known to positively aﬀect local wage bargaining outcomes and
consequently, workers at the headquarters ﬁrm are predicted to earn larger wages than
their colleagues at the subsidiary level (see e.g. Budd, Konings, and Slaughter, 2005).
Thus, our paper suggests that countries tend to proﬁt more from hosting a multina-
tional headquarters ﬁrm than from hosting a multinational subsidiary. This may, for
example, rationalize government policies to create national champions by intervening
in international M&A activities. But our results also in a broader sense suggest that it
is in the national interest of economic policy to strengthen the domestic parent ﬁrms
rather than trying to attract subsidiaries from abroad.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a theoretical motivation
for our analysis, Section 3 describes our data set. In Section 4, we present our estimation
methodology and in Section 5 the estimation results. Section 6 discusses implications
of our ﬁndings and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the proﬁt distribution of multinational
ﬁrms is skewed in favor of the headquarters location. There are two strings of the
literature which suggest a positive proﬁtability gap between parent ﬁrms and their
subsidiaries: the ﬁrst proposes agency costs to give rise to a higher proﬁtability of
headquarters investment, while the second suggests that the same pattern is induced
by home market advantages.
The agency cost theory is related to the notion of “vertical” FDI, i.e. the presumption
that value chains comprising various functions like manufacturing, logistics, marketing
and R&D are geographically separated across borders. Recent contributions brought
forward empirical evidence for this kind of vertical fragmentation (see Campa and
Goldberg, 1997; Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi, 1998; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001;
4Hanson, R. J. Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2001; Hanson, R. J. Mataloni, and Slaughter,
2005). Assuming that the proﬁtability of functions within the value chain diﬀers, the
MNE may strategically choose the location of proﬁt-driving operations.1 Several pa-
pers in the business economics literature suggest that MNEs have a tendency to keep
valuable functions with the head oﬃce as physical distance hampers communication
and the headquarters management thus faces agency and information costs if these
operations are run abroad (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak,
1999; O’Donnell, 2000).2 Nevertheless, the last decade was also characterized by the
development of new technologies like the internet and the mobile phone which have
lowered communication costs and might henceforth have dampened agency problems
caused by geographic separation (see e.g. Freund and Weinhold, 2002, Blinder, 2006).
This suggests that the proﬁtability gap is not constant over time but has declined in
recent years.
A second literature strand proposes that the proﬁtability gap between headquarters
and their foreign subsidiaries may be induced by a diﬀerent mechanism which is related
to the notion of “horizontal” FDI. Precisely, the papers suggest that exporting the
MNE’s business model and products to foreign countries by setting up production
and sales units there may result in lower proﬁtability rates since these units may for
example have less knowledge about language, customs and consumer behavior than
their domestic competitors or since the MNE’s products might have been developed
to ﬁt domestic not foreign consumer preferences (e.g. Dunning, 1977; Brakman and
Garretsen, 2008).3
In the following, we will bring these hypotheses to the data and test whether op-
1Some contributions suggest that the functions which drive the corporate proﬁt are knowledge and
marketing related, like R&D and advertisement (see e.g. Zingales, 2000).
2Furthermore, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), analyze the widespread organizational
form of corporate pyramids which are strongly associated with agency problems.
3Note that two other mechanisms may give rise to a proﬁtability bias in favor of the parent ﬁrm.
Firstly, Betrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) show that business groups expropriate minority
shareholders by tunneling proﬁts from ﬁrms where they have low cash ﬂow rights (e.g. subsidiaries
owned by less than 100% of the ownership shares) to ﬁrms where they have high cash ﬂow rights (e.g.
the headquarters ﬁrm). However, as our empirical analysis compares parent ﬁrms and their wholly-
owned subsidiaries, this motive is not considered in our empirical analysis. Secondly, MNEs may have
an incentive to bias the location of proﬁts towards the parent ﬁrm in order to save withholding taxes
on dividend payments which become due upon repatriation. As withholding taxes on dividends are
however low within the European Union, we consider this to be unlikely which is empirically conﬁrmed
in a robustness check.
5erations located at the headquarters ﬁrm are indeed more proﬁtable than operations
located at foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, we will assess the role of agency costs and
the home market eﬀect in driving this proﬁtability pattern.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on the commercial database AMADEUS which is compiled
by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed in-
formation on ﬁrm structure and accounting of national and multinational corporations
in Europe. We focus on 27 European countries and on the time period of 1999 to 2006
as these countries and years are suﬃciently represented by the database. One major
advantage of AMADEUS is that it allows to link accounting information on parent
ﬁrms and their corporate subsidiaries which makes the data set ideal for our purpose.
For an observation to be included in the sample, it has to belong to a multinational
entreprise. The parent ﬁrms in our sample are the global ultimate owner of a multina-
tional group and own at least one subsidiary in a foreign country with an ownership
share of 100%. The subsidiaries in our sample likewise belong to a multinational group
in the sense that they are wholly owned by a parent corporation in a foreign country.
The subsidiaries may own (further) subsidiaries themselves whereas this is not decisive
for our qualitative results. The country statistics for the parent and subsidiary sample
are presented in Table 1.4
[Table 1 here]
Moreover, in our baseline regressions we restrict the sample to ﬁrms which earn a
positive pre-tax proﬁt since our theoretical considerations apply particularly well to
ﬁrms with a positive proﬁt and this allows us to abstract from loss-oﬀset regulations.
Additionally, it enables us to take the logarithm of the pre-tax proﬁtability as the
dependent variable which is suggested since the variable exhibits a rather skewed dis-
tribution. However, in robustness checks we reran our regressions including ﬁrms with
negative pre-tax proﬁts and did not ﬁnd qualitatively diﬀerent results.
The observational unit in our analysis is the multinational aﬃliate, i.e. the parent or
subsidiary ﬁrm, per year. In total, our baseline sample comprises 107,930 observations
4Note that Irish and Swiss subsidiaries are not be included in the analysis as the cost of employees
information is missing in all cases.
6from 25,393 aﬃliates for the years 1999 to 2006 belonging to 18,531 multinational
groups. 49.1% of the observations are parent ﬁrms. This number may seem surprisingly
high but simply reﬂects the fact that our data does not only comprise corporate groups
for which both, the parent ﬁrm and at least one corporate subsidiary, are available but
also MNEs for which either one or the other is observed. Since many ﬁrms in our
data are parents with subsidiaries outside of Europe (which then are not covered by
AMADEUS), the fraction of parent ﬁrms in our sample is quite large.5
As our analysis will include ﬁxed eﬀects for the multinational group, the parent bias
is identiﬁed via the former set of groups only which account for 57,261 observations.
The rationale for equally keeping the other ﬁrms in the sample is that the coeﬃcient
estimates of all other control variables are predicted to be econometrically more precise.
However, as a robustness check, we reran our regressions on the sub-sample of ﬁrms
for which parent and subsidiary information is available and found our qualitative
and quantitative results to be conﬁrmed. Note moreover that in this sub-sample of
multinational groups the fraction of parent ﬁrms is calculated to be a moderate 23.5%.
Furthermore, to control for country characteristics, we merge data on GDP, GDP per
capita, a corruption index and the statutory corporate tax rate to the ﬁrm accounting
data.6 Table 2 displays basic descriptive sample statistics.
[Table 2 here]
On average, the aﬃliates in our sample observe a pre-tax proﬁt of 18.6 million US
dollars, ﬁxed asset investments of 154.3 million and sales of 191.9 million US dollars.
The average ﬁrm employs 565 workers. The median of the distributions is substantially
smaller for all three variables. The median for the proﬁtability measures gross proﬁt
margin (i.e. pre-tax proﬁt over sales) and EBIT margin (i.e. earnings before interest
and tax over sales) is estimated with 5.85% and 5.76% respectively. Note, moreover that
the sample characteristics substantially diﬀer between parent ﬁrms and subsidiaries.
First, parent ﬁrms tend to be larger than their subsidiaries with an average ﬁxed assets
5Note that AMADEUS contains ownership information on a worldwide basis, i.e. on the host
country of all subsidiaries and shareholders worldwide, whereas accounting information is available
for ﬁrms located in Europe only.
6The statutory tax rate data is taken from the European Commission. Country data for GDP and
GDP per capita are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2008. The
Corruption Perceptions Index is taken from Transparency International and ranks from 0 (extreme
level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
7stock of 285.4 million US dollars and a median of 8.61 million versus an average ﬁxed
asset stock of 27.7 million and a median of 0.60 million US dollars at the subsidiary
level. Additionally, the descriptive statistics already suggest a proﬁtability gap between
parents and their subsidiaries as the median of the gross proﬁt margin and EBIT margin
at the parent level is 6.39% and 6.05% respectively, while the median of these ratios
at the subsidiary level is calculated with 5.43% and 5.49% respectively. In the next
section, we will investigate whether this descriptive pattern prevails when we control
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity between the MNEs and aﬃliates.
4 Estimation Approach
Following our theoretical considerations in Section 2, we estimate an empirical model
of the following form
logπijt = β0 + β1PARENTijt + β2Xijt + φj + ρt + ijt (1)
whereas πijt represents the proﬁtability measure of aﬃliate i belonging to multinational
group j at time t. We employ two proﬁt variables which are taken from the ﬁrms’
unconsolidated balance sheet information: proﬁt before tax (PBT) and earning before
interest and tax (EBIT). While PBT captures the overall aﬃliate proﬁt (comprising
operating and ﬁnancial proﬁts), the EBIT measure depicts the ﬁrm’s operating proﬁt.
In the following, we will determine the proﬁtability gap between parents and their
subsidiaries in terms of both variables. Moreover, since the proﬁt variables exhibit a
rather skewed distribution (cf. e.g. the divergence of mean and median in Table 2), we
employ a logarithmic transformation.
The explanatory variable of central interest is PARENTijt which depicts a dummy
that takes on the value 1 if the considered aﬃliate is an independent parent ﬁrm and
the value 0 if it is a dependent subsidiary. Our theoretical considerations suggest that
the proﬁtability of assets at the parent ﬁrm exceeds the proﬁtability of assets at the
subsidiary and henceforth, β1 > 0. In the contrary, if neither agency costs nor the home
market eﬀect play a decisive role, we expect β1 = 0. Our regressions moreover control
for a set of subsidiary and country characteristics depicted by the vector Xijt. Precisely,
we condition on the size of the multinational aﬃliate by including the entity’s capital
investment and payroll costs7 and furthermore account for aﬃliate age to acknowledge
that young ﬁrms entering a market may face additional costs.
7Note that including the aﬃliate’s payroll bill as an explanatory variable controls for both dif-
ferences in the wage rate as well as diﬀerences in the skill level and productivity of the aﬃliates’
8Moreover, we include a full set of ﬁxed eﬀects for the multinational group to control
for non-observable, MNE speciﬁc characteristics φj which may determine the prof-
itability of all aﬃliates within the group. While the use of a group ﬁxed-eﬀects model
is generally suggestive in our context, it is also preferred to a random eﬀects model by a
Hausman-Test. Furthermore, year dummies ρt are included to capture shocks over time
which are common to all aﬃliates. Additionally, we account for a full set of country
dummies. These absorb time-constant country characteristics, for example, diﬀerences
in the education and skill level or diﬀerences in accounting laws which may translate
into diﬀering reported proﬁtability levels. Apart from that, we also include diﬀerent
time-varying macro controls which may exert an impact on aﬃliate proﬁtability (GDP
as a proxy for the market size, GDP per capita as a proxy for the degree of development
of a country, an index of corruption as a proxy for the overall risk of a country and the
statutory corporate tax rate as a proxy for the corporate tax burden). ijt describes
the error term.
5 Estimation Results
The following section presents the results for the estimation model speciﬁed above.
Section 5.1 discusses our baseline regressions. Section 5.2 investigates the development
of the proﬁtability gap over time. Section 5.3 assesses the role of agency costs and the
home market eﬀect in driving the results and Section 5.4 discusses various robustness
checks. Throughout the analysis, the observational unit is the multinational aﬃliate per
year. All regressions include a full set of group ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The
result tables display the coeﬃcient estimates and, in parentheses, heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors which are adjusted for clustering at the group level.
5.1 Baseline Estimations
Tables 3 and 4 present our baseline speciﬁcations. In Table 3, we estimate equation
(1) employing the aﬃliate’s pre-tax proﬁt and EBIT measure as dependent variable. In
Speciﬁcation (1), we regress the aﬃliate’s pre-tax proﬁt on a parent dummy and control
variables for the input factors, a full set of group ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
As predicted by our theoretical considerations, the coeﬃcient estimate for the parent
workers. Note moreover that we also reestimate equation (1) accounting for an additional size control
by normalizing on a sales factor, i.e. by employing the aﬃliate’s gross proﬁt margin (=PBT per sales)
and EBIT margin (=EBIT per sales) as dependent variables.
9dummy exhibits a positive sign and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Quanti-
tatively, multinational parent ﬁrms are suggested to observe a level of pre-tax proﬁts
which is by 88% larger than the pre-tax proﬁts of their subsidiaries. This qualitative
result is robust against the inclusion of a full set of country ﬁxed eﬀects and time-
varying country characteristics (GDP, GDP per capita, corruption index and statutory
corporate tax rate) in Speciﬁcation (2), the aﬃliate’s debt-to-assets ratio in Speciﬁca-
tion (3) and a set of two-digit NACE code industry dummy variables in Speciﬁcation
(4). Adding these additional control variables reduces the size of the coeﬃcient esti-
mates for the parent dummy. Speciﬁcation (4) suggests that (conditioning on the input
factors and the other control variables) parent ﬁrms observe pre-tax proﬁts which are
by 65% larger than proﬁts at their corporate subsidiaries.8
[Table 3 here]
In a second step, we re-estimate the regressions presented in Columns (1) to (4)
using EBIT as the dependent variable and thus determining diﬀerences in the operat-
ing proﬁtability between parents and their subsidiaries. The results are presented in
Columns (5) to (8) and qualitatively resemble the results for the pre-tax proﬁt measure
although the point estimates of the parent eﬀect are quantitatively smaller. Column
(8) suggests that (conditioning on the input factors and all other control variables) op-
erating proﬁts at the parent ﬁrm are on average by 43% larger than operating proﬁts
at its subsidiaries.
Note that in all speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient estimates for the control variables ex-
hibit the expected sign. The corporate input factors, ﬁxed assets investments and cost
of employees, enter positively and are statistically signiﬁcant suggesting that the pro-
duction displays decreasing returns to scale as the coeﬃcient estimates add up to less
than 1. The leverage ratio has a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the aﬃliate’s proﬁt
level which reﬂects that highly leveraged ﬁrms are more dependent on creditors and are
therefore restricted with respect to the riskiness of their projects which results in lower
expected proﬁtability rates. Moreover, the host country’s GDP per capita impacts pos-
itively on ﬁrm proﬁts as does a low level of corruption (note that a high corruption
index stands for a low level of corruption). The coeﬃcient estimate for the statutory
corporate tax rate exhibits a negative sign which is commonly interpreted to reﬂect
proﬁt shifting activities from high-tax to low-tax locations. A country’s GDP exerts a
8Note moreover that the adjusted R2 in all speciﬁcations is high, between 79.3% and 80.4%,
increasing with the set of additional control variables.
10signiﬁcantly negative impact in the EBIT speciﬁcations which may reﬂect that a higher
degree of competition in larger consumer markets depresses operating proﬁts.
[Table 4 here]
In Table 4, we re-estimate the speciﬁcations presented in Table 3 adding another size
control by normalizing the speciﬁcations on aﬃliate sales. Thus, we regress the gross
proﬁt margin (= pre-tax proﬁt/sales) and the EBIT margin(=EBIT/sales) on a set of
control variables comprising the input factors per sales and a size control. The results
are depicted in Table 4 and conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings as they indicate a large and
statistically signiﬁcant parent bias. Column (4) suggests that after controlling for input
factors, the ﬁrm leverage, macro characteristics and ﬁxed year, country, industry and
MNE-group eﬀects, parent ﬁrms are by 65% more proﬁtable than their subsidiaries in
terms of the gross proﬁt margin. Columns (5) to (8) re-estimate the speciﬁcations using
the EBIT margin as the dependent variable and ﬁnd comparable, although somewhat
smaller, coeﬃcient estimates. The most conservative estimate in Column (8) suggests
a proﬁtability gap of 30%. We additionally experimented with other proﬁtability mea-
sures which imply the normalization of equation (1) on an aﬃliate’s total assets and
its number of employees respectively. These regressions show comparable results which
are available from the authors upon request.
5.2 Development over Time
Thus, our baseline analysis provides evidence for a signiﬁcant and quantitatively rel-
evant parent bias in the location of proﬁtable operations across multinational aﬃli-
ates. As discussed above, this eﬀect is however not necessarily constant over time. If
agency costs contribute to the proﬁtability gap between parents and their corporate
subsidiaries, one might presume that the proﬁtability gap has declined in the past
decade since the rise of new technologies has facilitated communication and informa-
tion exchange and has consequently lowered agency costs for monitoring operations at
geographically separated aﬃliates. The same pattern might to some extent also prevail
if the home market eﬀect drives the proﬁtability gap since markets in the EU have
become more open and a proceeding integration may have enlarged the knowledge of
local customs and consumption behavior.
[Table 5 here]
11To empirically assess this hypothesis, we interact our parent dummy variable with a
linear time trend.9 The results are presented in Table 5. In Column (1), we regress the
pre-tax proﬁt measure on the parent dummy and the time trend interaction. In line
with our presumption, the coeﬃcient estimate for the parent dummy exhibits a positive
sign and is statistically signiﬁcant while the coeﬃcient estimate for the interaction term
between the parent dummy and the time trend exhibits a signiﬁcantly negative sign.
Consequently, while in our ﬁrst sample year 1999 parents observe a pre-tax proﬁt
(conditioned on the input factors) which is about twice as large as the pre-tax proﬁt
at their subsidiaries, this proﬁtability gap closes by around 2.4 percentage points in
each of the successive years. This corresponds to a closure of the proﬁtability gap
by 17% in our 7-year sample period. This result is conﬁrmed when we account for
additional control variables in Speciﬁcation (2) or alternative proﬁtability measures
in Speciﬁcations (3) to (8). Note that in terms of the EBIT margin (Column (7) and
(8)), the decline in the proﬁtability gap is reported to be quantitatively even more
pronounced since the proﬁtability gap between the parent and the subsidiary closes by
37% or 13.3 percentage points from its initial level of 36%.10
5.3 A Closer Look: Agency Costs and Home Market Eﬀect
As described in Section 2, we presume that the proﬁtability gap between headquarters
and their subsidiaries may be driven by agency costs or home market advantages. The
aim of the following section is to get an idea whether and to what extent the two
mechanisms contribute to the proﬁtability gap.
To disentangle the role of agency costs and the home market eﬀect, we split the sam-
ple in “horizontal” and “vertical” foreign direct investments. As described in Section 2,
the agency costs theory largely relates to the notion of “vertical” FDI as the argument
refers to the location choice of diﬀerent operations in the multinational value chain
that may vary in their corporate proﬁtability. In the contrary, the home market eﬀect
largely relates to the notion of “horizontal” FDI as it discusses potential proﬁtability
diﬀerences in selling the same product on diﬀerent markets. To identify “horizontal”
9The linear time trend variable takes on the value 0 for our ﬁrst sample year 1999, the value 1 for
the second sample year and so on.
10As a sensitivity check, we interacted the parent dummy variable with a dummy for each sample
year. All coeﬃcient estimates exhibit a negative sign and smoothly grow in absolute size over time
which suggests a steady decline of the proﬁtability gap in our sample period. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
12and “vertical” investment in our sample, we exploit four-digit NACE industry informa-
tion on the parent and its corporate subsidiaries. Precisely, if the subsidiary operates
in the same four-digit NACE industry as the parent ﬁrm, it is classiﬁed as “horizon-
tal” FDI whereas it is considered “vertical” FDI if it operates in a diﬀerent four-digit
industry. Consequently, we run two sets of regressions: one, in which we include only
subsidiaries that observe the same four-digit NACE industry as their parent, and a
second, in which we include only subsidiaries that observe a diﬀerent four-digit indus-
try than their parent. The results are presented in Table 6. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2)
re-estimate our baseline regressions for the two sub-groups employing the proﬁt before
taxation (PBT) measure as dependent variable. The coeﬃcient estimate for the par-
ent dummy variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in both samples indicating
that the proﬁtability gap between headquarters ﬁrms and their subsidiaries prevails in
horizontal investment settings as well as in vertical investment settings. Thus, we may
conclude that our sample indicates that both, home market advantages and agency
costs drive a wedge between the proﬁtability of headquarters and subsidiaries (whereas
the impact of the former appears to be quantitatively larger).
[Table 6 here]
In Speciﬁcations (3) and (4), we interact the parent dummy with a linear time
trend following our analysis in the previous section. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the
size of the proﬁtability gap between headquarters and subsidiaries remains constant
over time in the sample accounting for horizontal subsidiaries (and the home market
eﬀect respectively) while it signiﬁcantly declines in the sample accounting for vertical
subsidiaries (and the agency costs theory respectively). In the context of our theoretical
presumptions, this suggests that technological advances have indeed induced a fall in
agency costs over the last decade while advantages of operating in home markets have
remained largely unchanged.11 Finally, we reestimate the presented PBT-regressions
11A third mechanism which may drive the proﬁtability gap between parents and their subsidiaries
and has not yet been discussed in the paper is that MNEs potentially bias the distribution of their
proﬁts in favor of the headquarters ﬁrm to save withholding taxes on dividend payments from sub-
sidiaries to their parent. However, as the withholding taxes on dividends have been low between EU
countries over the last decades and were abolished through the EU’s Parent-Subsidiary Directive in
2004, we consider this to be an unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we reran our
regressions excluding all subsidiary-year combinations from our sample which face a non-zero with-
holding tax rate on dividends. As this sample restriction does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
change our ﬁndings, we are conﬁdent that withholding taxes are not a major driver of our results.
13using EBIT as the dependent variable and ﬁnd comparable results (see Speciﬁcations
(5) to (8)).
5.4 Robustness Checks
Last, we ran a set of sensitivity checks. Due to space restrictions, many of the robustness
checks are only sketched in the text whereas the detailed results are available from the
authors upon request.
First, we hedge against the possibility that our parent dummy estimate picks up
a ﬁrm age eﬀect. Younger corporations are often perceived to be less proﬁtable than
more established ﬁrms since they e.g. still have to engage in upfront investments. As
parent ﬁrms are commonly older than their subsidiaries, the observed proﬁtability gap
may simply reﬂect this age diﬀerence. Thus, we rerun our baseline speciﬁcations and
additionally include the ﬁrm age as a control variable. The results are presented in Table
7 and indicate that the proﬁtability gap is robust against controlling for ﬁrm age.12 The
coeﬃcient estimates for the parent dummy is almost unchanged in size compared to the
speciﬁcations without the age control variable. Moreover, the coeﬃcient estimate for
the age variable exhibits the expected positive sign, suggesting that more established
ﬁrms earn higher returns on their input factors. Since the information on the date of
incorporation is not available for all ﬁrms in the database, the number of observations
drops by around 20%.
[Table 7 here]
In a second step, we furthermore investigate whether our results are unique to the
international context or whether the proﬁtability gap prevails on a domestic scale. To
assess the proﬁtability gap within national groups, we use a sample of domestic enter-
prises, i.e. parent ﬁrms and their domestic subsidiaries, drawn from the AMADEUS
data base for the same countries and years as our baseline sample.13 The regressions
12The speciﬁcations presented in Table 7 use the logarithm of ﬁrm age as explanatory variable since
the ﬁrm age distribution is considerably skewed. Alternatively, taking no logarithmic transformation of
the age variable and additionally including the quadratic transformation yields the same estimations
results. Then, the coeﬃcient estimate for the age variable turns out to be positive while the coeﬃcient
estimate for the age-squared variable is signiﬁcantly negative.
13The parents in this new sample are domestic ultimate owners of their subsidiaries, i.e. some of the
parent ﬁrms may observe a foreign shareholder implying that they operate on an international scale.
In a sensitivity check, we restricted the sample to purely national groups without any international
14include around 450,000 observations from about 80,000 aﬃliates. The results are pre-
sented in Table 8 and show qualitatively the same picture as our baseline regressions for
MNEs whereas the estimated proﬁtability gap is however - as expected - quantitatively
smaller (roughly one third of the proﬁtability gap in the baseline speciﬁcations).14
[Table 8 here]
Moreover, we hedge against potential reverse causality problems which may arise
if highly proﬁtable ﬁrms are more likely to be a multinational parent. This might be
problematic, especially as in mergers & acquisition the more proﬁtable ﬁrm is perceived
to commonly take over the less proﬁtable one. To account for this possibility, we run
a robustness check identifying corporate aﬃliates which were either acquired by a
corporate group in the past or which took over a foreign subsidiary through an M&A
by using Bureau van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database which contains M&A back until 1997.
Excluding these aﬃliates from the data does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
change our results.15
In further robustness checks, we reran our regressions including only subsidiaries that
do not own any further subsidiaries themselves which slightly increased the quantitative
coeﬃcient estimates of the parent dummy. Moreover, we excluded holding companies
from our baseline MNE-sample which likewise strengthened the proﬁtability bias. Ad-
ditionally, we repeated the regression analysis including aﬃliates with negative proﬁts
which leaves our qualitative results unaﬀected. Last, we split our baseline MNE-sample
into ten industry groups (at the NACE 1–digit level) and found the proﬁtability gap
between parent ﬁrms and their foreign subsidiaries to be rather homogeneous across
ownership connections and found comparable results.
14Note, that the coeﬃcient estimates for the parent dummy in the ‘multinational’ baseline and the
‘domestic’ sensitivity regression are statistically diﬀerent at the 99% conﬁdence level. Moreover, in
the latter regressions the corruption index enters negatively suggesting a risk premium required by
domestic corporations doing business (that mostly have no international location opportunity like
MNEs) if corruption is high and property rights are less protected (represented by a low index).
15Note, however, that the data indeed indicates that in M&A more proﬁtable ﬁrms on average take
over less proﬁtable ones. Moreover, since there is a (weak) positive correlation between the parent
dummy variable and the size of the input factors, we account for potential reverse causality between
the proﬁtability measure and the input factors by rerunning our equations and instrumenting for the
input factor variables ﬁxed assets (per sales) and cost of employees (per sales) and for the leverage ratio
through lagged values of these variables. The regressions show neither a qualitative nor a quantitative
change in the coeﬃcient estimate for the parent dummy.
15the industries.
6 Implications
Thus, our analysis ﬁnds robust evidence for a proﬁtability bias in the location of valu-
able operations and projects in favor of the parent ﬁrm. Although the documented
proﬁtability gap between parents and subsidiaries has declined over the recent years,
we still ﬁnd it to be sizable. Our results have implications for several areas of research
and policy making.
First, they imply that headquarters ﬁrms pay higher taxes on their corporate activ-
ity than subsidiaries, simply because headquarters activities are more proﬁtable. To
test this implication empirically, we use our baseline sample and regress an aﬃliate’s
unconsolidated tax payments on the parent dummy and a set of control variables (size
controls, a full set of group ﬁxed eﬀects, country ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed eﬀects and
time-varying country characteristics). The results are depicted in Table 9. While the
speciﬁcations presented in Columns (1) to (4) use the aﬃliate’s tax payments as the
dependent variable, the speciﬁcations in Columns (5) to (8) are normalized on aﬃliate
sales, and thus the regressand is tax payments per sales. The coeﬃcient estimate for
the parent dummy exhibits a positive sign and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Quantitatively, parent ﬁrms are found to observe by 61% higher tax payments on
their corporate activity compared to their subsidiaries (cf. Column (8) of Table 9).16
[Table 9 here]
Along the same lines, the documented proﬁtability bias might well inﬂuence multi-
national proﬁt shifting behavior in response to corporate tax rate diﬀerentials. A large
literature shows that multinational ﬁrms engage in proﬁt shifting activities from high-
tax to low-tax countries in order to reduce their corporate tax burden (see e.g. Clausing,
2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). If MNEs are however reluctant to relocate proﬁtable
16There may be concerns that the gap in tax payments between headquarters and their subsidiaries
is driven by residence based taxation in the MNE’s home country which may enhance the MNE’s tax
bill at the headquarters location. As this argument refers to a relatively small number of European
countries with residence based taxation according to a credit system (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom), we reran our regressions excluding all
groups that are headquartered in a credit country and found our results qualitatively and quantita-
tively unchanged.
16operations and proﬁtable assets away from the headquarters ﬁrm, they might respond
less to tax rate diﬀerentials between the headquarters and the corporate subsidiaries if
the head oﬃce is located in a high-tax country. In the contrary, if the headquarters ﬁrm
is located in a low-tax country and consequently proﬁt shifting activities run from the
subsidiaries toward the headquarters location, proﬁt shifting is expected to be strongly
responsive to tax rate diﬀerentials. A proper analysis of these aspects goes beyond the
scope of this work and is referred to a companion paper in which we present evidence
in line with this pattern (Dischinger and Riedel, 2009).
Additionally, several papers suggest that the wages bargained for workers at a multi-
national aﬃliate are strongly dependent on the aﬃliate’s proﬁtability (see e.g. Budd,
Konings, and Slaughter, 2005). In the context of our paper, this implies that workers
at multinational headquarters ﬁrms earn higher wages than comparable workers at the
subsidiary level. Our data is unfortunately not well suited to investigate this question
as we do not observe information on the employees’ skill level. However, regressing the
average aﬃliate worker’s wage on the parent dummy indicates a wage premium for
headquarters workers (not reported). An in-depth analysis of this issue is delegated to
future research.
Summing up, our analysis shows that the proﬁtability of headquarters projects sub-
stantially outweighs the proﬁtability of subsidiary operations. The discussion in this
section suggests that these proﬁtability diﬀerences have substantial welfare implica-
tions as headquarters ﬁrms tend to pay higher taxes to the government and higher
wages to their employees than subsidiary ﬁrms.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that the location of proﬁts within multinational enter-
prises is biased toward the headquarters ﬁrm. Using a large panel of European MNEs
and conditioning on input factors employed, our most conservative estimates suggest
that headquarters exhibit a 30% higher proﬁtability than their foreign subsidiaries.
In line with previous theoretical contributions, the paper discusses that this pattern
might be driven by two eﬀects: ﬁrstly, MNEs may prefer to keep their value-driving
functions at the headquarters location as physical distance to foreign subsidiaries gives
rise to agency problems; and secondly, MNEs may have advantages from operating in
home markets as they commonly know local customs and consumer behavior better
than foreign competitors. We present suggestive evidence which proposes a role for
17both mechanisms in driving the proﬁtability gap.
However, our results also indicate some cracks in the notion and status of the parent
company as proﬁt center of the multinational group. Precisely, we ﬁnd that the prof-
itability gap between parents and their subsidiaries decreases over time. Quantitatively,
the decrease is sizable, pointing to a decline of the gap by up to around 30% in seven
years. As our results indicate that the closure of the proﬁtability gap is related to the
agency cost argument, they support the widespread perception of an increased frag-
mentation of the production process across international borders which today does not
only comprise standard operating functions like manufacturing and sales but equally
includes value-driving units like R&D and licensing departments.
The results have various implications for public economic policy. Our analysis for
example shows that headquarters ﬁrms pay higher taxes on their corporate activity than
subsidiaries. Moreover, in a companion paper we ﬁnd that MNEs are reluctant to shift
proﬁts and proﬁtable assets away from corporate headquarters in response to tax rate
diﬀerentials. Additionally, higher proﬁtability rates at the multinational headquarters
ﬁrms are expected to translate into a wage premium for the parent ﬁrm’s workers.
Consequently, our ﬁndings suggests that countries experience larger welfare gains from
hosting a multinational parent ﬁrm than from hosting a multinational subsidiary. This
implies that governments in general have a higher incentive to support and develop their
multinational headquarters ﬁrms than to attract foreign subsidiaries. In this context,
the proﬁtability gap between headquarters and subsidiaries may also rationalize recent
government actions to avoid the take-over of national ﬁrms by foreign companies and
the associated attempt to create national champions.
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Table 1: Country Statistics
Country All Aﬃliates Parent Firms Subsidiaries
Austria 271 135 136
Belgium 2,092 1,123 969
Bulgaria 78 5 73
Croatia 186 57 129
Czech Republic 519 77 442
Denmark 1,724 828 896
Estonia 240 24 216
Finland 537 14 523
France 2,838 1,283 1,555
Germany 1,395 731 664
Great Britain 3,175 960 2,215
Hungary 34 9 25
Ireland 30 30 0
Italy 2,339 1,418 921
Latvia 10 0 10
Luxembourg 23 14 9
Netherlands 2,068 1,404 664
Norway 1,112 365 747
Poland 738 44 694
Portugal 273 82 191
Romania 512 12 500
Serbia 69 2 67
Slovakia 82 5 77
Spain 2,644 1,231 1,413
Sweden 2,226 1,392 834
Switzerland 138 138 0
Ukraine 40 2 38
Sum 25,393 11,385 14,008
19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Dummy Parent Firm 107,930 .4912 0 0 1
Proﬁt before Tax (PBT)F 107,930 18,623 884 1 1.67e+07
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 107,930 14,857 850 1 1.52e+07
Gross Proﬁt Margin (PBT per Sales) 100,181 2.32 .0585 1.73e-05 26,393
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 100,181 .1024 .0576 1.73e-05 295
SalesF 100,181 191,893 16,151 1 1.46e+08
Fixed AssetsF 107,930 154,263 2,486 1 1.04e+08
Cost of Employees 107,930 26,530 2,183 1 2.26e+07
Number of Employees 107,930 565 44 1 99,837
Financial Leverage Ratio 102,227 .5937 .6209 0 1
GDPN 107,864 932.1 610.7 5.63 2,915
GDP per CapitaJ 107,864 28,778 27,892 633 74,471
Corruption IndexI 107,864 7.34 7.4 1.5 10
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 107,864 .3251 .3399 .1 .523
Parent ﬁrms only:
Proﬁt before Tax (PBT)F 53,011 32,967 1,683 1 1.67e+07
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 53,011 26,711 1,538 1 1.52e+07
Gross Proﬁt Margin (PBT per Sales) 48,650 3.53 .0639 1.73e-05 26,393
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 48,650 .1214 .0605 3.22e-05 295
Fixed AssetsF 53,011 285,419 8,612 1 1.04e+08
Cost of Employees 53,011 46,423 3,921 1 2.26e+07
Subsidiary ﬁrms only:
Proﬁt before Tax (PBT)F 54,919 4,778 520 1 8.06e+06
Earnings before Interest & Tax (EBIT)F 54,919 3,878 528 1 2.64e+06
Gross Proﬁt Margin (PBT per Sales) 51,531 1.18 .0543 2.71e-05 23,304
EBIT Margin (EBIT per Sales) 51,531 .0852 .0549 1.73e-05 64.7
Fixed AssetsF 54,919 27,664 599 1 3.76e+07
Cost of Employees 54,919 7,328 1,391 1 6.33e+06
Notes:
F Unconsolidated values, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
 = (total liabilities / total assets).
N In billion US dollars, current prices, data from IMF WEO Database October 2008.
J In US dollars, current prices, data from IMF WEO Database October 2008.
I Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), ranks from 0 (extreme level of corruption)
to 10 (free of corruption).
20Table 3: Baseline Estimation I – Higher Parent Proﬁts
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log (Proﬁt before Tax) Log EBIT
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .877∗∗∗ .858∗∗∗ .697∗∗∗ .650∗∗∗ .547∗∗∗ .497∗∗∗ .398∗∗∗ .429∗∗∗
(.044) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.043) (.044) (.045) (.045)
Log (Fixed Assets) .231∗∗∗ .227∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗ .214∗∗∗ .148∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗ .136∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007)
Log (Cost Employees) .464∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .488∗∗∗ .505∗∗∗ .606∗∗∗ .167∗∗∗ .634∗∗∗ .633∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Leverage Ratio -1.26∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -.720∗∗∗ -.726∗∗∗
(.043) (.043) (.040) (.039)
Log GDP -.238 -.222 -.172 -.209∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗ -.189∗∗
(.148) (.143) (.184) (.066) (.061) (.079)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .609∗∗∗ .414∗∗∗ .339∗ .315∗∗∗ .212∗∗ .203∗
(.169) (.165) (.201) (.101) (.098) (.110)
Log Corruption .231∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .296∗∗∗ .138∗∗ .177∗∗∗ .166∗∗
(.079) (.079) (.079) (.068) (.069) (.069)
Statutory Tax Rate -.962∗∗∗ -.754∗∗∗ -.784∗∗∗ -.609∗∗∗ -.407∗ -.418∗
(.239) (.235) (.236) (.215) (.220) (.220)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 107,930 107,864 102,227 101,828 107,106 107,046 100,973 100,567
# MNE–Groups 18,531 18,531 18,007 17,923 18,067 18,066 17,514 17,433
Adjusted R2 .7928 .7940 .8033 .8041 .8117 .8140 .8192 .8204
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making multinational parent
ﬁrms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. Parent Dummy is a
dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log (Cost Employees)
is the natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27 country
dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent
to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
21Table 4: Baseline Estimation II – Higher Parent Proﬁtability
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log (Proﬁt b. Tax per Sales) Log (EBIT per Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .930∗∗∗ .927∗∗∗ .746∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .443∗∗∗ .299∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
(.046) (.048) (.048) (.047) (.038) (.039) (.039) (.039)
Log (Fixed Assets .444∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .407∗∗∗ .369∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗ .145∗∗∗ .137∗∗∗
per Sales) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.014) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Log (Cost Employees .043∗∗∗ .032∗ .014 .016 -.054∗∗∗ -.039∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ -.068∗∗∗
per Sales) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Log (Fixed Assets) -.243∗∗∗ -.255∗∗∗ -.222∗∗∗ -.200∗∗∗ -.120∗∗∗ -.112∗∗∗ -.087∗∗∗ -.089∗∗∗
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Leverage Ratio -1.57∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗
(.044) (.043) (.035) (.035)
Log GDP -.217 -.193 -.141 -.182∗∗∗ -.165∗∗∗ -.148∗∗
(.148) (.143) (.183) (.064) (.061) (.071)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .568∗∗∗ .322∗∗ .231 .169∗ -.012 -.025
(.167) (.162) (.198) (.093) (.090) (.097)
Log Corruption .170∗∗ .274∗∗∗ .275∗∗∗ .105∗ .190∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗
(.079) (.077) (.077) (.065) (.064) (.064)
Statutory Tax Rate -.652∗∗∗ -.351 -.362 -.311 .033 .016
(.231) (.226) (.227) (.197) (.199) (.200)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 100,181 100,117 94,893 94,525 99,846 99,786 94,143 93,766
# MNE–Groups 17,191 17,191 16,702 16,624 16,846 16,845 16,337 16,261
Adjusted R2 .5987 .6003 .6303 .6340 .4662 .4698 .4976 .5010
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making multinational parent
ﬁrms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. Parent Dummy is a
dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log (Cost Employees
per Sales) is the natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit
level) and 27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables
regression equivalent to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
22Table 5: Extension – Development over Time
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT p.Sales) Log(EBIT p.Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .968∗∗∗ .714∗∗∗ .635∗∗∗ .503∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ .702∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .360∗∗∗
(.047) (.049) (.045) (.047) (.049) (.049) (.040) (.041)
Parent×Time -.024∗∗∗ -.017∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.020∗∗∗ -.025∗∗∗ -.015∗∗∗ -.024∗∗∗ -.019∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Time .062∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .031∗∗∗ .026∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗
(.003) (.007) (.003) (.006) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.006)
Log (Fixed Assets) .233∗∗∗ .216∗∗∗ .151∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ -.243∗∗∗ -.199∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ -.088∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.007) (.008)
Log (Cost Employees) .463∗∗∗ .504∗∗∗ .604∗∗∗ .632∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.011) (.012)
Log (Fixed Assets .446∗∗∗ .370∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .138∗∗∗
per Sales) (.015) (.014) (.010) (.010)
Log (Cost Employees .041∗∗ .015 -.056∗∗∗ -.069∗∗∗
per Sales) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.019)
Leverage Ratio -1.26∗∗∗ -.722∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(.042) (.039) (.043) (.035)
Log GDP -.163 -.171∗∗ -.134 -.133∗∗
(.181) (.073) (.181) (.066)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .263 .106 .167 -.113
(.199) (.107) (.198) (.095)
Log Corruption .296∗∗∗ .166∗∗ .273∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗
(.079) (.069) (.077) (.064)
Statutory Tax Rate -.781∗∗∗ -.414∗ -.350 .033
(.236) (.220) (.227) (.200)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 107,930 101,828 107,106 100,567 100,181 94,525 99,846 93,766
# MNE–Groups 18,531 17,923 18,067 17,433 17,191 16,624 16,846 16,261
Adjusted R2 .7930 .8042 .8119 .8205 .5990 .6341 .4668 .5013
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making multinational parent
ﬁrms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. The abbreviation PBT
stands for Proﬁt before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and
set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Time is set to 0 for the year 1999, 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001,..., and 7 for 2006, with a mean
of 3.5. Parent×Time is the interaction term between Parent Dummy and Time. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27
country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression
equivalent to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
23Table 6: Extension – Vertical & Horizontal FDI
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log PBT Log EBIT Log EBIT
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .917∗∗∗ .608∗∗∗ .917∗∗∗ .677∗∗∗ .630∗∗∗ .368∗∗∗ .686∗∗∗ .437∗∗∗
(.092) (.060) (.119) (.066) (.097) (.059) (.118) (.064)
Parent×Time -.000 -.018∗∗∗ -.014 -.018∗∗∗
(.016) (.007) (.016) (.006)
Time .038∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ .045∗∗ .025∗∗∗
(.020) (.012) (.019) (.011)
Log (Fixed Assets) .164∗∗∗ .240∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .241∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ .158∗∗∗ .131∗∗∗ .160∗∗∗
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.010) (.012) (.010)
Log (Cost Employees) .466∗∗∗ .472∗∗∗ .466∗∗∗ .471∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .611∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .610∗∗∗
(.018) (.016) (.018) (.016) (.020) (.017) (.020) (.017)
Leverage Ratio -1.172∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -1.172∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ -.607∗∗∗ -.656∗∗∗ -.607∗∗∗ -.655∗∗∗
(.061) (.062) (.061) (.062) (.058) (.054) (.058) (.054)
Log GDP -.238∗ -.251∗ -.238∗ -.244∗ -.108∗∗ -.157∗∗ -.106∗∗ -.148∗∗
(.137) (.137) (.137) (.136) (.052) (.066) (.052) (.063)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .166 .514∗∗∗ .166 .453∗∗ -.125 .161 -.142 .094
(.213) (.196) (.214) (.195) (.155) (.140) (.156) (.138)
Log Corruption .431∗∗∗ .399∗∗∗ .431∗∗∗ .387∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .226∗∗∗ .260∗∗∗ .215∗∗∗
(.112) (.102) (.112) (.102) (.098) (.087) (.098) (.088)
Statutory Tax Rate -.425 -.800∗∗∗ -.425 -.767∗∗ -.000 -.541∗ .006 -.505∗
(.338) (.318) (.338) (.317) (.326) (.299) (.327) (.298)
Investment Type H V H V H V H V
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 53,071 62,441 53,071 62,441 51,437 60,854 51,437 60,854
# MNE–Groups 11,187 17,923 11,187 17,923 10,652 10,854 10,652 10,854
Adjusted R2 .6037 .6416 .6037 0.6419 .6637 .6762 .6644 .6766
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making multinational parent
ﬁrms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. The abbreviation PBT
stands for Proﬁt before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and
set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Time is set to 0 for the year 1999, 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001,..., and 7 for 2006, with a mean
of 3.5. Parent×Time is the interaction term between Parent Dummy and Time. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27
country dummies are included in all regressions. Moreover, the investment type “H” indicates horizontal FDI, i.e. the
corresponding regressions in Column (1), (3), (5) and (7) include only subsidiaries for which the subsidiary observes
the same four-digit NACE code industry as the parent ﬁrm. Analogously, the investment type “V” indicates vertical
FDI, i.e. the corresponding regressions in Column (2), (4), (6) and (8) include only subsidiaries for which the subsidiary
operates in a diﬀerent four-digit NACE code industry than the parent ﬁrm. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a
dummy variables regression equivalent to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
24Table 7: Robustness Check – Control for Firm Age
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT p.Sales) Log(EBIT p.Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .923∗∗∗ .729∗∗∗ .560∗∗∗ .467∗∗∗ .963∗∗∗ .740∗∗∗ .446∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗
(.058) (.061) (.058) (.060) (.063) (.062) (.055) (.054)
Log Age .117∗∗∗ .067∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .046∗∗ .097∗∗∗ .045∗∗ .025 .012
(.020) (.021) (.019) (.020) (.022) (.021) (.016) (.016)
Log (Fixed Assets) .214∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ -.286∗∗∗ -.235∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ -.087∗∗∗
(.011) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.013) (.014) (.011) (.011)
Log (Cost Employees) .427∗∗∗ .478∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗ .607∗∗∗
(.015) (.017) (.015) (.016)
Log (Fixed Assets .471∗∗∗ .392∗∗∗ .172∗∗∗ .121∗∗∗
per Sales) (.019) (.019) (.013) (.013)
Log (Cost Employees .017 .008 -.116∗∗∗ -.115∗∗∗
per Sales) (.020) (.021) (.019) (.020)
Leverage Ratio -1.22∗∗∗ -.642∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗
(.053) (.048) (.054) (.042)
Log GDP -.130 -.135∗∗ -.109 -.116∗
(.170) (.060) (.176) (.062)
Log (GDP p.Capita) .201 .006 .206 -.079
(.206) (.116) (.208) (.106)
Log Corruption .312∗∗∗ .199∗∗ .272∗∗∗ .185∗∗
(.093) (.082) (.092) (.076)
Statutory Tax Rate -.842∗∗∗ -.298 -.487∗ .037
(.281) (.265) (.275) (.243)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 78,012 74,272 76,706 72,696 72,121 68,707 71,242 67,564
# MNE–Groups 14,785 14,368 14,303 13,855 13,607 13,239 13,240 12,843
Adjusted R2 .8161 .8248 .8359 .8422 .6596 .6858 .5182 .5442
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making multinational parent
ﬁrms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. The abbreviation PBT
stands for Proﬁt before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and
set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of the ﬁrm age in years. Log (Cost Employees per
Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost of employees per sales. 56 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and
27 country dummies are included where indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression
equivalent to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
25Table 8: Robustness Check – Parents vs. Domestic Subsidiaries
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log PBT Log EBIT Log(PBT p.Sales) Log(EBIT p.Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .360∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗ .084∗∗∗ .252∗∗∗ .463∗∗∗ .229∗∗∗ .189∗∗∗ .128∗∗∗
(.011) (.023) (.012) (.022) (.011) (.022) (.010) (.019)
Log (Fixed Assets) .253∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗ .222∗∗∗ .220∗∗∗ -.290∗∗∗ -.229∗∗∗ -.172∗∗∗ -.136∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Log (Cost Employees) .362∗∗∗ .376∗∗∗ .460∗∗∗ .443∗∗∗
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log (Fixed Assets .488∗∗∗ .408∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗ .242∗∗∗
per Sales) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
Log (Cost Employees -.042∗∗∗ -.055∗∗∗ -.161∗∗∗ -.168∗∗∗
per Sales) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Leverage Ratio -1.19∗∗∗ -.499∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗ -.961∗∗∗
(.022) (.021) (.021) (.019)
Log Age .074∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ .015∗∗ -.019∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005)
Log GDP -.075∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ -.058∗∗ -.040∗
(.025) (.024) (.025) (.023)
Log (GDP p.Capita) -.026 -.095 .004 -.061
(.065) (.059) (.061) (.052)
Log Corruption -.196∗∗∗ -.192∗∗∗ -.265∗∗∗ -.253∗∗∗
(.052) (.047) (.051) (.043)
Statutory Tax Rate -.607∗∗∗ -.439∗∗∗ -.281∗ -.265∗∗
(.159) (.145) (.156) (.131)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √ √ √
# Observations 519,915 466,129 508,344 453,835 454,167 405,509 453,271 403,135
# Firm–Groups 89,241 84,105 85,856 80,617 74,266 69,995 72,938 68,526
Adjusted R2 .7729 .7838 .7931 .8012 .6013 .6357 .5136 .5405
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making domestic parent
ﬁrms and domestic subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a ﬁrm–group. The abbreviation PBT stands
for Proﬁt before Tax. Parent Dummy is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and set
to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the natural logarithm (Log) of the ﬁrm age in years. Log (Cost Employees per
Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost of employees per sales. 88 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) are
included where indicated. Country dummies are not included due to no variation in the country of a parent and their
subsidiary(ies) which is a condition in a ﬁxed–eﬀects model. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables
regression equivalent to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
26Table 9: Implication – Higher Parent Tax Payments
OLS Group–Fixed–Eﬀects, Panel 1999–2006
Dependent Variable Log (Tax Payments) Log (Tax Payments per Sales)
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Parent Dummy .874∗∗∗ .802∗∗∗ .656∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .875∗∗∗ .812∗∗∗ .637∗∗∗ .614∗∗∗
(.081) (.081) (.082) (.083) (.087) (.088) (.088) (.085)
Log (Fixed Assets) .119∗∗∗ .120∗∗∗ .107∗∗∗ .109∗∗∗ -.242∗∗∗ -.253∗∗∗ -.230∗∗∗ -.228∗∗∗
(.013) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.016) (.017) (.017) (.018)
Log (Cost Employees) .562∗∗∗ .553∗∗∗ .581∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗
(.019) (.020) (.021) (.022)
Log (Fixed Assets .325∗∗ .341∗∗∗ .301∗∗∗ .291∗∗∗
per Sales) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.023)
Log (Cost Employees .061∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ .055∗∗ .048∗
per Sales) (.025) (.027) (.027) (.029)
Leverage Ratio -1.08∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗
(.067) (.068) (.064) (.065)
Log Age .119∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗
(.026) (.026)
Log GDP -2.30∗∗∗ -2.13∗∗∗ -1.89∗∗ -2.16∗∗∗ -1.99∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗
(.822) (.823) (.833) (.799) (.790) (.800)
Log (GDP p.Capita) 2.52∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗
(.844) (.841) (.857) (.817) (.804) (.819)
Log Corruption .079 .122 .122 .034 .090 .107
(.128) (.127) (.127) (.129) (.126) (.127)
Statutory Tax Rate 2.14∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗
(.431) (.430) (.432) (.433) (.429) (.433)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Country Dummies
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry Dummies
√ √
# Observations 51,878 51,851 48,949 47,640 48,262 48,235 45,516 44,291
# MNE–Groups 9,406 9,405 9,118 8,923 8,698 8,697 8,439 8,269
Adjusted R2 .7692 .7758 .7831 .7839 .5392 .5500 .5676 .5749
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for group clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are proﬁt–making multinational
parent ﬁrms and multinational subsidiaries. A group–ﬁxed–eﬀect is set for belonging to a MNE–group. Parent Dummy
is a dummy variable set to 1 if an observational unit is a parent ﬁrm and set to 0 if it is a subsidiary. Log Age is the
natural logarithm (Log) of the ﬁrm age in years. Log (Cost Employees per Sales) is the natural logarithm of the cost
of employees per sales. 53 industry dummies (NACE Rev.1 2–digit level) and 27 country dummies are included where
indicated. Adjusted R2 values are calculated from a dummy variables regression equivalent to the ﬁxed–eﬀects model.
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